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Synopsis: The following is an essay on the notion of scientific explanation as 
unification. In it a new notion of (logical) content is used to explicate Michael 
Friedman's notion of "k-atomicity," and to explicate the notion of the surplus 
content of hypothesis h relative to evidence e. From this basis an analysis of 
unification as theoretical reduction is advanced. A second notion of 
unification, unification as reconciling prima facie incompatible statements, is 
introduced again with the aid of this new notion of content. More generally, it 
is argued that rather than seek the essence of scientific explanation we 
should carefully catalog the various distinct explanatory virtues. Finally it is 
argue that in particular philosophical explanations put a high premium on the 
quality of unification through showing how to make compatible seemingly 
irreconcilable claims. 
1. Against A Definition of Explanation 
 
     What is the nature of explanation?  In his "Explanation and Scientific Understanding" 
Michael Friedman advanced the idea that explanation is unification.  The unification 
Friedman has in mind occurs when a vast number of apparently disparate phenomena are 
brought under the reign of a few compact laws.  For instance, Friedman cites the kinetic 
theory of gases as effecting a significant unification in what we have to accept.  Where we 
once had three independent brute facts - that gases approximately obey the Boyle-
Charles gas law, that they obey Graham's law, and that they have the specific heat 
capacities they do have - we now have only one - that molecules obey the laws of 
mechanics.  Furthermore, the kinetic theory also allows us to integrate the behavior of 
gases with other phenomena, such as the motions of the planets and of falling bodies 
near the earth. (Friedman (1974), pp. 14-15). 
What makes for unification, according to Friedman, is a reduction of "the total number of 
independent phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or given." (loc. cit.). 
     Unfortunately, Friedman's semi-formal account of this notion of explanation as 
unification as reduction of independent phenomena is open to some telling criticisms, as 
demonstrated by Philip Kitcher (Kitcher 1976) and below (Cf. Section 3). Kitcher himself 
remains sympathetic to Friedman's identification of explanation and unification and 
proposes his own account of what is involved in such unification (Kitcher 1981). 
     Besides the idea that explanation is unification, Friedman and Kitcher share a tacit 
assumption common to many philosophers of science.  They assume that there is a 
nature of explanations, as if explanations formed a natural kind to be demarcated by a set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions.  Now perhaps this assumption is correct, but no 
one has yet provided any reason (good or bad) for making it.  Therefore, until positive 
reasons for accepting it are forthcoming, I suggest the following more modest approach.  
Let us attempt to catalog and elucidate various explanatory virtues without assuming that 
they can somehow be fashioned into a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
explanation.  Here we leave open the plausible possibility that different explanations 
contain different explanatory virtues to different degrees.  Given a sufficient catalog of 
explanatory virtues we can then discuss the merits and demerits of various purported 
explanations.  Where disagreements about explanatory power arise it will be interesting to 
find out whether the disputants disagree because they differ in their assessments of 
whether the relevant explanation has a particular explanatory virtue, as against, for 
instance, disagreeing because they place different emphasis on different virtues. 
     As an entree into this admittedly ambitious project I want to consider Friedman's and 
Kitcher's preferred explanatory virtue, namely, unification. 
 
 
2. Unification as Reduction 
 
     Suppose we have a number of independent phenomena described by the independent 
sentences S1, S2, . . . ,Sn - what is involved in independence need not concern us just 
yet.  It is tempting to think that if we find a sentence S which describes all the phenomena 
described by S1, S2, . . . , Sn, we have thereby effected a reduction of S1, S2, . . ., Sn.  
However this temptation soon fades when we realize that where S is simply the 
conjunction of S1, S2, . . . , Sn, we have a sentence that describes all the relevant 
phenomena without effecting any reduction.  The problem here is that we have merely 
replaced n independent sentences with a sentence with n independent parts. To make 
any progress here we need an understanding of how to determine how many independent 
parts a sentence has. 
     Friedman proposes that we count a sentence S as being acceptable independently of 
another sentence S' if there are sufficient grounds for accepting S which are not sufficient 
for accepting S'.  Independent acceptability, according to Friedman, satisfies the following 
conditions: 
      
(1) If S├Q then S is not acceptable independently of Q. 
(2) If S is acceptable independently of P and Q├P then S is  
    acceptable independently of Q. (Friedman (1974), pp.16-17). 
To this we may presumably add the condition 
(3) If S is acceptable independently of P and S├Q then Q is  
    acceptable independently of P.1
Friedman then sets about defining reduction as follows: 
 
     Let a partition of a sentence S be a set of sentences Γ such that Γ is logically 
equivalent to S and each S' in Γ is acceptable independently of S. . . . I will say that a 
sentence is K-atomic if it has no partition i.e. if there is no pair {S1, S2} such that S1 and 
S2 are acceptable independently of S and S1&S2 is logically equivalent to S. . . . Let a K-
partition of a set of sentences D be a set Γ  of K-atomic sentences which is logically 
equivalent to D (I assume that such a K-partition exists for every set D).  Let the K-
cardinality of a set of sentences D, K-card (D), be inf {card (Γ):Γ is a K-partition of D}. . . . 
Finally I will say that S reduces the set Diff K-card (D U {S}) < K-card (D). (loc.cit.) 
 
He then gives an account of explanation in terms of this definition of reduction.  He 
introduces the term con(S) to stand for the set of independently acceptable consequences 
of S, and defines explanation as follows: 
 
     S1 explains S2 iff S2 ∈ con(S1) and S1 reduces con(S1). 
 
     Kitcher has shown that these definitions have the unpalatable consequence that only 
K-atomic sentences can explain.  Briefly, the problem is that if S1 is not k-atomic con(S1) 
is equivalent to S1.  To see this we need merely recall that if S1 is not k-atomic there are 
sentences S3 and S4 such that S3 and S4 are independently acceptable of S1 and 
S3&S4 is logically equivalent to S1.  In this case since both S3 and S4 are consequences 
of S1 and are independently acceptable of S1 they are members of con(S1).  Therefore, 
since the conjunction of S3 and S4 is logically equivalent to S1, and both are members of 
con(S1), con(S1) entails S1.  On the other hand since every member of con(S1) is a 
consequence of S1, S1 entails con(S1).  Therefore (con(S1) U {S1}) is equivalent to 
con(S1). Since (con(S1) U {S1}) and con(S1) are equivalent and in determining the K-
cardinality of a set we are to consider any set logically equivalent to the set in question, in 
determining the K-cardinality of (con(S1) U {S1}) and con(S1) we will be considering the 
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same sets.  In other words, they have the same K-cardinality and hence S1 does not 
reduce con(S1) and hence S1 does not explain S2. 
     This technical difficulty is related to an important intuitive question: Why should a 
sentence, or set of sentences, S1 reduce some sub-class of its own consequence class, 
for instance con(S1), if it is to explain another sentence S2?  If S2 is a member of a sub-
class S, say {S2, S3, . . . ,Si},  of S1's consequence class and the K-cardinality of S1 is 
less than the K-cardinality of S it seems reasonable to say that S1 reduces S.  In this case 
we have reduction because while S1 contains all of the content of S it contains fewer 
independently acceptable content parts than does S. This may not give us much of a 
handle on what is involved in S1 explaining S2, but it gives a neat idea of what is involved 
in a sentence, or perhaps class of sentences,  reducing, hence unifying, a class of 
sentences.  And this indeed was one of the problems Friedman originally set out to 
illuminate. 
     I have previously suggested it is mistaken to take one explanatory virtue, for instance 
reduction, as the essence of explanation.  When we couple this with the technical 
difficulties  facing Friedman's account of explanation we have sufficient incentive to drop 
Friedman's proposed account of explanation and see if we can salvage from it an account 
of what we may here call r-unification - 'r' for reduction.  However, before proceeding to 
offer such an account we need to amend Friedman's account of K-atomicity.  In amending 
Friedman's account of K-atomicity we will need to make a detour to consider what exactly 
should count as part of the contents of a statement.  This detour will have a further pay-off 
in allowing us to explicate a new notion of reduction in the later parts of this paper. 
 
 
3. Content and K-atomicity 
 
     Consider the following case: Die A has just been rolled and I have the following reports 
from Peter, Paul, and Luke all of whom I take to be perfectly reliable die reporters: Peter 
says A came up 1, 2 or 3, Paul says A came up 1, 4 or 5 and Luke says it came up 1.  
Now the claim S, 'A came up 1,' is equivalent to the conjunction of the claims S', 'A came 
up 1,2 or 3,' and S'', 'A came up 1,4 or 5.'  Clearly I have sufficient grounds for accepting 
each of these claims, on the one hand the testimony of Peter on the other the testimony of 
Paul, which taken individually are not grounds for accepting S.  Thus by Friedman's 
account S is not K-atomic.  This, presumably, is extremely counter-intuitive.  Moreover 
suppose there are sentences A and B such that you have sufficient reason for accepting A 
and sufficient reason for accepting B, however unbeknownst to you A and B are 
inconsistent.  For instance, suppose A is a complex mathematical claim that a reliable 
book you have read cites as a theorem and B is another mathematical claim for which you 
yourself have fashioned a proof and that unbeknownst to you B entails not A.  In this case 
for you, for any sentence S such that A and B are both independently acceptable of S, S is 
not K-atomic. This follows since for any such sentence S, S is equivalent to (SvA)&(SvB) 
and both A and B, and hence SvA  and SvB  are independently acceptable of S. 
     That a statement S can be factored into independently acceptable disjunctive 
statements containing disjuncts with content completely extraneous to the content of S 
should have no bearing on the question of whether S is k-atomic.  The question is not 
whether S can be partitioned by any old means into consequences independently 
acceptable of S.  The important question is whether S can be partitioned into distinct 
content parts independently acceptable of S.  The difference here is that while SvA and 
SvB will count as consequences of S for arbitrary S, B, and A, they will not generally count 
as content parts of S.  The account of content invoked here is that presented in chapter 2 
above.  
 
If for k-atomicity we demand that there be no independently acceptable content parts 
ratter than merely no independently acceptable factors our problem cases disappear.  In 
particular, where A and B are mathematical statements immaterial to S, neither SvA nor 
SvB will be content parts of S.  Similarly, 'Die A came up 1, 4 or 5' is not a content part of 
'Die A came up 1.'  
 Indeed, if we exchange Friedman's demand that k-atomic sentences not be 
divisible into independently acceptable consequences for the demand that they not be 
divisible into independently acceptable content parts we render Friedman's account 
immune from counter-examples developed in by Wes Salmon.2
                                                 
2 Cf. Salmon (1989), pp. 96-99. 
In Salmon (1989, pp.96-99) Salmon claims that under Friedman's account law statements 
of the conditional form  
(1)   (x)(Fx ⊃ Gx) 
will typically not be k-atomic since there will typically be some predicate H such that (1) is 
equivalent to the conjunction of the two members of the set 
(2) {(x)(Fx&Hx ⊃ Gx), (x)(Fx&~Hx ⊃ Gx)} 
where both members of the set are acceptable independently of (1).  Now if we demand 
that k-atomic statements not be divisible into independently acceptable content parts 
Salmon's counterexample does not hold since neither of the members of (2) are content 
parts of (1). 
     This, then, is why the statement consisting of a conjunction of Boyle-Charles law and 
Graham's law is not k-atomic: It has a content part, for instance Graham's law, which is 
acceptable independently of the conjunction in question.  Conjunctions of independently 
acceptable statements do not achieve any real unification of their conjuncts because they 
contain as independent content parts the very contents allegedly being unified.  That is 
why the conjunction of the Boyle-Charles law, Graham's law, Galileo's law and Kepler's 
laws does not reduce the set of its conjuncts. 
     Here then is an alternative definition of K-atomicity: 
 D1  S is K-atomic =df. There are no content parts S1 and S2 of S such that S1 and S2 
are acceptable independently of S and each other and S1 & S2 is 
logically equivalent to S. 
We may keep Friedman's original definition of a K-partition, 
D2   L is a K-partition of S =df. L is a set of k-atomic sentences such that L is                                   
logically equivalent to S. 
and K-cardinality, 
D3   K-card S =df. inf{card (Γ):Γ is a K-partition of S}. 
 
4. R-unification  
 
Finally we define the notion of r-unification as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
D4   S r-unifies S' =df. There is some subset S* of S such that  
                         S*├S' and K-card S* < K-card S'. 
The reference to subsets occurs in order to allow the possibility, for instance, that S may 
contain distinct subsets S* and S** which respectively reduce different sets of sentences 
S1 and S2.  In this case we need to focus on the K-cardinality of S* against S1 and S** 
against S2 rather than, for instance, S against S1. 
     Is what I have called r-unification equivalent to the plain old notion of reduction?  While 
all cases of r-unification count as cases of reduction I believe there are some cases of 
reduction which will not satisfy the criteria for r-unification.  Consider those cases where 
we discover that a number of seemingly independent laws can be deduced from a 
significantly smaller number of laws combined with a variety of facts about initial 
conditions.  Such cases often qualify as bona fide reductions. However if the set of initial 
conditions is large enough it may be that the K-cardinality of the set of reducing laws and 
relevant initial conditions is larger than the K-cardinality of the set of reduced laws.3  Of 
course, if we had clear criteria for distinguishing law statements from statements of initial 
conditions we could speak here of a reduction of laws.  However failing this we may still 
regard r-unification as a species of reduction and as such it is an explanatory virtue that 
speaks well for any theory that possesses it.      
 
 
5. Unification as the Reconciling of Incompatible Claims 
 
     Having suggested that unification through reduction is not all there is to explanation, I 
now want to argue that unification through reduction is not the sole form of explanatory 
unification. 
     Consider the following kind of (partial) explanation:  The explanation of the fact that 
Ron is in Indiana and in Illinois is that he is in fact presently straddling a state line and that 
Indiana and Illinois share a state line. Here the explanans is effective because it 
reconciles prima facie conflicting facts in the explicandum.  The tension between the two 
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facts, that Ron is in Indiana and that Ron is in Illinois, is resolved by the putative 
explanation.  Such explanations effect a unification of prima facie incompatible 
phenomena.  This type of explanation occurs in the mathematical, the natural, and the 
social sciences, as well as in everyday common sense settings.  For instance, the posit of 
the ether had the explanatory virtue of unifying conflicting claims from post-Newtonian 
mechanics and electrodynamics.  Laws of statistical mechanics have the benefit of 
reconciling the prima facie incompatible claims that the fundamental laws of physics are 
time-reversal symmetric yet laws governing macroscopic observable phenomena are 
often time-reversal asymmetric.  Early formulations of quantum theory gained much 
plausibility from their ability to reconcile the claims that light exhibited both a wave-like and 
a particulate nature. Perhaps the chief explanatory virtue of Freud's theory of unconscious 
desires is that it is capable of unifying apparently conflicting phenomena, for instance, a 
subject's apparently sincere claims to love his father with his repeated obsessive thought 
that his father is experiencing horrible torture.  I suspect that it is chiefly this virtue, to the 
exclusion of just about every other explanatory virtue, that makes Freudianism so 
attractive.  If so this should makes us ever more insistent in demanding that putative 
explanations display a robust mix of explanatory virtues rather than exhibiting only one or 
two while excluding all others. 
     The type of unification involved in the above cases, where prima facie conflicting 
claims are rendered compatible by the introduction of new data, is clearly different from 
the type of unification considered by Friedman and Kitcher, where disparate phenomena 
are brought under a common description.  For Kitcher's and Friedman's unification there 
need be no initial tension, no incompatibility, between those phenomena that are being 
unified.  Where prima facie conflicting claims are rendered compatible there need be no 
reduction of independent phenomena. 
 
 
6. Weak Incompatibility Versus Genuine Incompatibility 
 
     Before defining what it is to render incompatible claims compatible we first need an 
account of what it is for claims to be incompatible in the first place.  If A is incompatible 
with B then believing A gives some reason for not believing B. In other words, A on the 
evidence of B is less credible than A in the absence of B. This relationship can be neatly 
captured in the language of the probability calculus as follows: P(A/B) < P(A), that is, the 
probability of A given evidence B, is less than the probability of A in the absence of any 
such evidence.  Indeed this seems to capture the incompatibility involved in our state line 
case. In that case the claim that Ron is in Indiana has a lower probability on the evidence 
that he is in Illinois than it has in the absence of such evidence.  This suggests the 
following definition, 
     A is incompatible with B =df. P(B/A) < P(B). 
It is encouraging to note that incompatibility so defined is a symmetric relation.  It follows 
from the probability calculus that P(B/A) < P(B) if and only if P(A/B) < P(A).  Symmetry of 
incompatibility is exactly what we would expect; if A is incompatible with B, then surely it 
follows that B is incompatible with A. 
     Unfortunately, this proposed definition of incompatibility is too weak.  Let A be the 
statement 'Fred graduated in the top 60% of his class' and B be the statement 'Fred 
graduated in the bottom 50% of the class.'  On our present definition A and B are 
incompatible since, prima facie, P(A) = 6/10 and P(A/B) = 1/5.  The problem here is that 
while B decreases the probability of A, it is obvious how A and B may be both be true; it 
simply need be the case that Fred graduated in the 40-50% range.  It seems specious to 
say this latter claim renders A and B compatible because it is so obvious a claim, given A 
and B, that it is spurious to say A and B are incompatible in the first place. 
     To render our claims about Ron compatible we had to introduce a new notion, namely, 
that of straddling a state line.  Similarly, Freud introduces new notions, such as that of the 
Oedipal complex, in order to reconcile conflicting attitudes subjects display towards their 
parents.  Similarly, the posit of the ether, and the recent posit of super-positions, involve 
the introduction of new concepts in order to reconcile prima facie conflicting claims.  In our 
case of the student Fred we did not need to introduce any new conceptual material in 
order to see how both the claim that he came in the top 60% of the class and the claim 
that he came in the bottom 50% could be true.   
     This suggests how we may strengthen our initial definition of incompatibility so that it 
covers our state line case but excludes the case of Fred the student.  For A and B to be 
genuinely incompatible it is not sufficient that P(A/B) < P(A).  It is also necessary that A 
and B can only be rendered compatible by introducing new conceptual material, that is, 
conceptual material that is foreign to A and B. 
     Are we making any progress?  At first blush it may seem that we are going around in 
circles: We deferred the problem of defining what it is to render conflicting claims 
compatible in favor of defining what it is for claims to be incompatible in the first place. 
Then, in attempting to define incompatibility, we found we needed recourse to the notion 
of rendering incompatible claims compatible.  In fact I think we have been making 
progress, albeit somewhat obliquely.  We have the beginnings of a notion of 
incompatibility in terms of unfavorable relevance.  If we can use this admittedly weak 
notion of incompatibility to define the notion of rendering compatible, we may return and 
define the notion of genuine incompatibility in terms of weak compatibility and rendering 
compatible by the introduction of new conceptual material.  The root idea is that A and B 
are genuinely incompatible if and only if A and B are weakly incompatible and they may 
only be rendered compatible by the introduction of conceptual resources foreign to both A 
and B. 
     Here then is our first definition: 
D5  A and B are weakly incompatible =df. P(A/B) < P(A). 
     Now what is involved in rendering weakly incompatible A and B compatible?  Well, if 
the incompatibility of A and B involves B counting against A, in the sense of being 
unfavorably relevant to A, could we not say that C renders incompatible A and B 
compatible if in the presence of C, B no longer counts against A?4  In the language of the 
probability calculus we may express this as follows: P(A/B&C) ò P(A/C).  This seems to 
capture our state line case well enough.  In that case the information that Jones is in 
Illinois, in the presence of the claim that Jones is straddling a state line and that Indiana 
and Illinois share a state line, serves to confirm that Jones is in Indiana.  Here then is the 
beginnings of a definition: 
C renders A and B compatible =df.     (i) P(A/B) < P(A) 
                                                            and  
                                                           (ii) P(A/B&C) ≥ P(A/C). 
                                                 
4 Suggested by Clark Glymour 
While this is a fair first step it is clearly not the whole story.  Let A be 'Ron is in Indiana,' B 
be 'Ron is in Illinois' and C be 'If Ron is in Illinois then Ron is in Indiana.'  In this case 
P(A/B) < P(A) and P(A/B&C) > P(A/C), yet clearly C does not render A and B compatible.  
Part of the problem here is that C is itself a consequence of A and hence does not tell us 
anything new to help reconcile A and B.  If C is to render A and B compatible then it must 
add something new, some new content not contained in A or B, in virtue of which the 
content of B no longer counts against A.  In seeing whether C really reconciles A and B 
we need to look not simply at C but at that part of C which goes beyond (the conjunction 
of) A and B.  This might aptly be called the surplus content of C relative to A and B.  The 
surplus content of C relative to A and B, that is (C-A&B), is the set of all content parts C' of 
C, such that no content part of C' is truth functionally dependent on any content part of 
ÚA&B¿.  For instance, where H is 'Ron is in Sydney & Alan is in Pittsburgh' and E is 
'Ron is in Sydney' the surplus content of H relative to E is (equivalent to) 'Alan is in 
Pittsburgh.'  In many typical cases the surplus content of C relative to A and B is simply C 
itself.  Nevertheless we need to makes use of the notion of surplus content to rule out 
cases such as that of the conditional 'If Ron is in Illinois then Ron is in Indiana' as a 
potential unifier of 'Ron is in Indiana' and 'Ron is in Illinois'. 
     Now we may amend our definition as follows: 
C renders A and B compatible =df.    (i) P(A/B) < P(A) and 
                                                          (ii) P(A/B&(C-A&B)) ≥ P(A/(C-A&B)). 
According to this definition C, 'If Ron is in Illinois then Ron is in Indiana' does not render A, 
'Ron is in Indiana', and B 'Ron is in Illinois' compatible.  Since A, 'Ron is in Indiana,' entails 
C, 'If Ron is in Illinois then Ron is in Indiana,' there is no part of C that goes beyond A and 
B.  Here, (C-A&B) = {/}.   So, for the right hand side of the above definition to be fulfilled 
we need, per impossible, (i) P(A/B) < P(A) and (ii) P(A/B) ≥ P(A).  On the other hand 
where C is 'Ron is straddling a state-line and Indiana and Illinois share a state line,'  (C-
A&B) is identical to C and the right hand side of our definition is fulfilled. 
     Yet consider the following case: A is 'Smith has a chess rating of 2100 and Jones has 
a rating of 1800,' B is 'Jones just beat Smith in four consecutive Chess games,' and C is 
'Smith has been humoring Jones in order to boost his confidence.'  Prima facie, in this 
case A and B are incompatible and C renders them compatible.  Yet here, arguably, the 
right hand side of our proposed definition is not satisfied since presumably  
P(A/B&(C-A&B)) < P(A/(C-A&B)).  The fact that Jones just beat Smith in four consecutive 
games does not, even in the presence of the claim that Smith is humoring Jones, cease 
counting against the chances that Smith is a much better player than Jones.  In this case 
the point is not that in the presence of the new information provided by C, B ceases to 
count against A.  Rather the point is that, in the presence of the new information in C, B 
loses much of its original sting against A.  In other terms, P(A/B&(C-A&B)) > P(A/B).  
      
     We need here to distinguish two different kind of cases.  In the first case the new 
information in C is itself favorable to A. In this case it is not enough that P(A/B&(C-A&B)) > 
P(A/B).  For it may be that the new information in C is merely inductive evidence for A that 
in no way helps to reconcile A and B.  Here our original definition in terms of P(A/B&(C-
A&B)) ≥ P(A/(C-A&B)) seems to fit the bill.  In the second case where the new information 
is not favorable to A it is sufficient (for reconciliation) that P(A/B&(C-A&B)) > P(A/B).  
Actually, since the new information in C may have a different bearing on B than it has on 
A, we need to complicate the picture a little.  Here then is our full definition, letting A, B 
and C range over sets of sentences: 
 
D6 C renders A and B compatible =df.  (i) P(A/B) < P(A) and 
                                                              (ii) P(A/C) ≤ P(A)  and P(A/B&(C-A&B)) > P(A/B) 
               or 
                     P(B/C) ≤ P(B)and P(B/A&(C-A&B)) > P(B/A)       
                      or 
                     P(A/C) > P(A)  and P(A/B&(C-A&B)) ≥ P(A/(C-A&B)) 
                      or 
                       P(B/C) > P(B)  and P(B/A&(C-A&B)) ≥ P(B/(C-A&B)). 
 
     We may now define genuine incompatibility as follows: 
 
D7    A and B are genuinely incompatible =df. A and B are weakly incompatible and any C 
that renders them compatible involves the introduction of new conceptual 
content. 
 
 While I do not here propose a formal mechanism for deciding what exactly is 
involved in the introduction of new conceptual content I presume the general idea is fairly 
clear.  For instance, the introduction of the concept of straddling a state line represents 
new conceptual content relative to the conceptual content of the claims that an individual 
is in Indiana and an individual is in Illinois, whereas the introduction of the concept of 
being within the 40-50% range does not represent new conceptual content with respect to 
the claims that an individual is in the 0-50% range and an individual is in the 40-60% 
range.  In the actual historical cases discussed below the fact that they involve new 
conceptual content will be readily apparent. 
 
7. C-Unification with Examples 
 
     A claim may be said to provide c-unification ('c' for compatibility) of our set of beliefs if it 
renders some genuinely incompatible members of that set compatible.  More formally, 
D8 C c-unifies A and B if A and B are genuinely incompatible and  
          C renders A and B compatible 
     Many of the greatest scientific hypotheses, including both successful and unsuccessful 
hypotheses, have had the explanatory virtue of providing c-unification for sets of beliefs 
widely accepted at the time of their proposal.  Actually, this overstates the case a little.  
Usually such cases do not simply involve the c-unification and continued acceptance of 
genuinely incompatible theories.  Rather they involve the acceptance of new claims 
intended to render the conflicting theories compatible plus a slight modification of the 
original theories.  For instance, in the case of the explanatory posit of the ether it is not the 
case that in light of this posit all of the old post-Newtonian mechanics could still be 
accepted.  The ether theory led to the abandonment of the claim that there are no 
absolute velocities.  In such cases we may say that the new posit provides c-unification in 
the sense that it renders compatible substantial content parts of the original theories. 
 Here, in brief, are some examples which illustrate the different ways new 
conceptual content may provide c-unification by rendering genuinely incompatible 
statements compatible.   
 The fist case is loosely drawn from Breuer's and Freud's case study of Ann O (Cf. 
Breuer and Freud (1960)).  Let A be the statement 'Anna O refuses to drink water' and B 
be the statement 'Anna O sincerely claims to have no reason for disliking water'.   Here 
P(A/B) < P(A).  Now let C be the conjecture 'Anna O has a strong unconscious association 
of water with an unpleasant event in her life".  Here, presumably, P(B/C) ≤ P(B) and P(B/A 
& (C-A&B)) ≥ P(B/A).  In particular, while the claim that Anna O has a a strong 
unconscious association of water with an unpleasant event in her life does not make it 
more probable that she sincerely claims to have no reason for disliking water,  the former 
claim lessens the sting of her refusal to drink water against the later claim.   Here the 
introduction of the new concept of unconscious associations helps reconcile the observed 
behavior of refusing to drink water and the sincerity of the disavowal of reasons for 
refusing to drink. 
 Our second case concerns the use of statistical mechanics to reconcile claims 
about time symmetry.  Let A be the claim that the fundamental laws of physics are time-
symmetric and B be the claim that the observed behavior of macroscopic entities exhibits 
time-asymmetry.  Here P(A/B) < P(A).  Let C be some standard version of statistical 
mechanics.  Then, presumably, P(A/C) > P(A) and, arguably,  P(A/B & (C-A&B)) ≥ P(A/(C-
A&B)).  In particular, while statistical mechanics makes it more probable that the 
fundamental laws of physics are time-symmetric, in the presence of statistical mechanics, 
the observed time-asymmetry in the behavior of macroscopic objects has no sting against 
the claim that fundamental laws are time-symmetric. For instance, Boltzmann's H-
Theorem demonstrates that the arrow of time is nothing but a representational feature of 
the course graining of confirmational variables.  Here the introduction of the concepts of 
statistical mechanics, for instance the notion of course graining, allows us to reconcile the 
observed time-asymmetric behavior of macroscopic objects with the claim about the time-
symmetry of fundamental laws. 
 Our third case, which concerns a conflict between known properties of elementary 
particles and claims about those properties derived from quantum electrodynamics, might 
be considered a more controversial example of c-unification.  Indeed, by discussing its 
controversial nature I hope to dramatize some of the claims about explanatory virtues 
made above.   
 According to the first principles of quantum electrodynamics (Q.E.D.), as formulated 
in Dirac's Lagrangian realization, peturbative calculations of the mass and charge of 
elementary particles, for instance electrons, yield infinite or indeterminate (e.g. ì - ì, ì/ì) 
quantities.  This conflicts with, among other things, basic electrostatics, for instance the 
fact that electrons are capable of stable orbits in atoms.  Renormalization Theory, as 
developed by Feynman, Schwinger and Tomonaga, gives an interpretation of these 
infinities through proper rescaling and in so doing provides a prescription for calculating 
with them.  In this renormalized representation the indeterminacies in charge and mass of 
elementary particles are removed and upon proper scaling the actual calculations of mass 
and charge yields finite quantities in agreement with basic electrostatic experimentation 
including measurements of the electron charge as obtained using the Wilson cloud 
chamber.  Simplifying somewhat, let A be the statement 'As determined by Dirac's 
Lagrangian realization, there are electrons with infinite or indeterminate mass and charge', 
B be the statement 'As determined by electrostatic experimentation, electrons have only 
finite and determinate mass and charge', and C be the statement  'The scaling involved in 
the claim that electrons have infinite or indeterminate charge is radically different form the 
scaling involved in the claim that electrons have only finite and determinate mass and 
charge'.  Here again P(A/B) < P(A), P(A/C) ≤ P(A) and P(A/B & (C-A&B)) > P(A/B).  In 
other words, while the claim that electrons as determined by Dirac's theory have finite and 
determinate mass and charge counts against the claim that electrons as determined by 
electrostatic experimentation have infinite and indeterminate mass and charge, in the 
presence of the claims that different scalings are involved in these two claims, the claim 
that they have finite and determinate mass and charge losses much of its sting against the 
claim that they have infinite and indeterminate mass and charge. 
 What is controversial in this example is the claim that Renormalization theory really 
reconciles the cited aspects of quantum electrodynamics and basic electrostatics.  Against 
this claim it might be argued that Renormalization Theory is merely a mathematical tool 
which only apparently reconciles conflicting claims but effects no real reduction in the 
tension between them.  Here, I think, the basis of complaint is the belief that 
Renormalization theory is seen merely as a way of allowing certain quantities to be 
calculated using various sophisticated mathematical techniques without diminishing the 
basic ontological conflict between Q.E.D. and basic electrostatics.  To those who would 
therefore deny that Renormalization Theory really helps reconcile incompatible claims I 
would make the following response:  You are confusing two different virtues, namely the 
virtues of reconciling incompatible claims and the virtue of having an ontological 
grounding.  Renormalization Theory really has the first virtue but lacks the second.  Those 
who are greatly struck by its lack of the second virtue are prone to say it is not really an 
explanatory theory at all.  In so doing they are prone to misextrapolate from the lack of an 
ontological grounding and claim that it therefore can have no explanatory virtue such as 
that of being able to reconcile conflicting claims.  I think it far better for the advocates of 
the virtue of ontological grounding to concede that it has the explanatory virtue of 
reconciling conflicting claims and then argue that since it lacks the, by their lights, all 
important virtue of having a clear ontological grounding it should not count as a good ,or, 
at least, full explanation.  In so doing they will come to the heart of the conflict between the 
opponents and advocates of renormalization theory, that is, their differing answers to the 
question of the importance of the explanatory virtue of having an ontological grounding. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we should note that the conflict between 
those who see this as a genuine case of c-unification and those who do not may be neatly 
reflected in the formalisms developed above.  To that extent it reflects well on the 
formalisms themselves.  In particular, those who still insist that Renormalization Theory 
(R.T.) does not serve to reconcile Q.E.D. claims about infinite and indeterminate masses 
and charges (Q.E.D.1) with the evidence of electrostatics (E.E.) will presumably claim that 
P(Q.E.D.1/E.E. & (R.T.-Q.E.D.1&E.E.)) ≤ P(Q.E.D.1/E.E).  That is to say, they will claim 
that the probability of the claims about infinite and indeterminate masses and charges are 
no more likely given the evidence of electrostatics and the new content added by 
Renormalization theory then they are given simply the evidence of electrostatics alone.  
On the other hand those who do see Renormalization theory as effecting the alleged 
unification will presumably claim that P(Q.E.D.1/E.E. & (R.T.-Q.E.D.1&E.E.)) > 
P(Q.E.D.1/E.E).  In other words, both the opponents and proponents of this alleged case 
of c-unification can accept those formalisms (notably D6, D7 and D8) however they will 
differ in the values given to the variables of the formalisms in this particular case.  Indeed 
the use of those formalisms allows us to help pinpoint exactly where the disagreement  
occurs. 
 
 
8.  Philosophical Explanation 
 
So far we have been dealing with cases of scientific explanation.  But it is worth 
noting that c-unification is often a central feature of putative philosophical explanations.  
Let us briefly consider some famous examples. 
In the free will debate philosophers have tried to reconcile the prima facie 
incompatible claims that man has free will and that all his actions are casually determined. 
Compatibilists such as Hume and Nietzsche have argued that when we understand that 
free will is grounded in character rather than any putative gap in the causal order (a causa 
sui) we see that causal necessity does not count against the possibility of free will but it 
actually a pre-condition for free will. The basic idea common to Hume and Nietzsche is 
that an act counts as free if it stems from, i.e. is caused by, one’s character.  Let A stand 
for the claim that “Man has free will” and B stand for the claim that “All things are causally 
determined”.  Prima face, here P(A/B) > P(A).   Let  C stand for the claim “One act freely 
where that act stems from one’s character”. Then the claim of Hume and Nietzsche is that 
here P(A/B&(C-A&B)) > P(A/B). 
Kant tried to reconcile free will and determinism by posting a world of noumena 
were freedom was possible as well as a world of phenomena which is governed by causal 
laws.  Indeed Kant explicitly presents the claims that all actions are causally determined 
and that some actions are free as an antinomy and uses this antinomy as ground for 
accepting his claim that there is a realm of noumena aside from the empirical world of 
phenomena.  Let A and B be as in the Hume/Nietzsche case above. So again P(A/B) > 
P(B).  Let C be ‘There is a world of noumena unconstrained by the causal order”. Kant’s 
claim is that here P(A/B&(C-A&B)) > P(A/B). Those who dispute the merits of Kant’s 
position typically do so by in effect denying that he has succeeded in unifying these 
claims.  In particular they deny that the existence of a world of noumena coupled with the 
claim that all actions are causally determined makes any more plausible the claim that 
some acts are freeing other words they deny that P(A/B&(C-A&B)) > P(A/B). 
 
Idealists philosophers such as Berkeley argue for their idealism on the grounds that 
it effects a reconciliation between the prima facie incompatible claims A, “There is a 
knowable world of external objects”, with the claim B,  “All Knowledge is based on internal 
experiences”.  The latter is seen as by itself decreasing the probability of the former on the 
grounds that is are direct knowledge is only of internal experience it is unclear how we 
could ever gain knowledge of things external, so P(A/B)>P(A).   Berkeley’s claim is in 
effect that, C, “External objects are nothing but collations of sensations eliminates the 
impact of B against A, so that that P(A/B&(C-A&B)) > P(A/B). Generally those who reject 
Berkeley’s solution do not dispute wither that P(A/B)>P(A) or that P(A/B&(C-A&B)) > 
P(A/B).  Rather they claim that C is itself just too prima facie implausible, in effect that 
P(C) is too low to deserve serious consideration. 
 
It is interesting to observe here that our formalism actually help focus where the 
dispute is in the Kant and Berkeley cases.  They show that in the first case the dispute is 
whether any actually reconciliation has actually taken place.  In the Berkeley case there is 
agreement that reconciliation has been effected but the dispute is whether the price paid 
is worth the reconciliation. 
 
Unification through the reconciling of prima facie incompatible claims, that is, r-
unification, forms a pattern of explanation in both the natural sciences and philosophy.  
However in the natural sciences other explanatory virtues are also to be demanded.  For 
instance empirically testability is a virtue that is rightly held in high regard in the natural 
sciences.  As noted above, in the case of Freudian theory, it is the lack of testability that 
has often been held against Freudian theory.  Often disputants about the value of a theory 
such as psychoanalysis can be seen as fundamentally differing in the weight they give 
various explanatory virtues.  Proponents of Freud tend to put a very high value of c-
unification while opponents put a very high value on testability.  I conjecture that in the 
case of philosophical theories r-unification is often deemed as the most important 
explanatory virtue and that a lot lower value is given to empirical testability.   
 
8. Conclusion 
 
     In looking for explanatory virtues rather than any fabled essence of explanation we 
open the path for serious discussion of wherein lie the merits and demerits of various 
putative explanations.  If we are opponents of a particular alleged explanation it allows us 
to concede that the explanation has certain virtues while emphasizing the lack of other 
virtues we take to be highly important; we need not simply brand it a non-explanation.  
Perhaps in certain cases we will find opposing camps for and against a particular putative 
explanatory theory in complete agreement about exactly which explanatory virtues the 
theory has.  They may even agree in their assessments of the degrees to which it has 
each such virtue.  Then the disagreement may simply come to the question of how to 
weigh the importance of particular explanatory virtues.  Here we may reach a genuine 
impasse.  But before we get there we need to get a clearer notion of exactly what are the 
explanatory virtues.  R-unification and c-unification are prima facie estimable explanatory 
virtues even if the semi-formal accounts provided here prove to be flawed. 
     The point of seeking formal or semi-formal accounts of alleged explanatory virtues is 
that it gives us something we can sink our teeth into.  Such accounts give a clearer 
indication of what is being talked about - we can test with some degree of precision 
through the use of examples and counter-examples. Further it helps us pinpoint 
disagreements about particular alleged cases.  For instance, if two disputants disagree 
over whether some theory T has the explanatory virtue of rendering genuinely 
incompatible claims C1 and C2 compatible, we can use D2 to see where their 
disagreement lies.  Is it because they disagree about whether P(C1/C2) is greater than 
P(C1)? Or is it because they disagree about whether P(C1/C2&T) is greater than 
P(C1/C2)?  Finally, it is nice to have formal accounts because they increase our ability to 
program our successors, be they humans or machines, with our own, undoubtedly 
excellent, tastes.  
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